The Non-ideology Ideology of End of Ideology Theories

‘The Non-ideology Ideology of End of Ideology Theories’

In this essay I examine the “End of Ideology’ theory, made popular first in the 60’s and then again in the early 90’s. I briefly outline the dominant narratives and consider the context in which this “non-ideology” ideology was conceived, as well as discussing its validity in contemporary society.

Historical Overview

In 1806 a German man named Georg Willem Hegel made the bold claim that history had come to its end. This followed shortly after Napoleon’s victory at the Battle of Jena. The victory became a symbol to Hegel. Representing the overall victory of French ideals of freedom, liberty and equality. To Hegel, it was only a matter of time before the rest of the world caught up and adopted these same ideals (Fukuyama: 1989). The tumultuous century that followed led to new ideologies being formed, instead of everyone subscribing to the French way of thinking. Between 1815-1848 most of Europe was engaged in revolutions. Long standing monarchies were challenged by people who started to realize, that they could have rights as well as duties (Bullock: 1969). At the end of these, opinions were varied about exactly how these “newly free” men should be governed. Different interpretations and new technological advances such as industrialisation and the rise of capitalism in the late 19th century provided fertile ground where new ideologies could develop (Bullock: 1969; Heywood: 2002). Two world wars later Daniel Bell declared ‘the end of ideology’, despite the fact that conflicting ideologies remained present in the world and the stage was set for a debate that still rages on(Calhoun: 2002, Heywood: 2002 ).






Major Contributors & Theories

The official credit for starting the ‘end of ideology’ debate is usually attributed to Daniel Bell, for a book he wrote in 1960 called ‘The End of Ideology’ (Calhoun: 2002; Heywood: 2002; Hoffman: 2002). Even though other political scientists had released similar texts in that same period (Calhoun: 2002). Bell believed that Ideologies such as Socialism and Liberalism had failed to deliver on their promises and saw the newly emerging democratic states as the answer. The stabilizing effect that these new liberal democratic states seemed to be having on industrialised countries was taken as proof of their victory over “inferior” ideologies (Calhoun: 2002; Haywood: 2002). All that was needed now was to wait while the rest of the world switched over.

Francis Fukuyama built on this idea as well as combining some of Hegel’s work in his own theory (Fukuyama: 1989) and in the early 90’s and in 1992 he wrote ‘The End of History’. This has become the ‘poster publication’ in the debate between different interpretations of the changing world orders. Fukuyama too believed that single triumphant ideology was emerging in the form political and economical liberalism (Haywood: 2002; Hoffman: 2002; Jisi & Sicheng: 1996, Seizaburo Sato: 1997). And was so convinced of its impending triumph that he ignored elements such as nationalism and politicized religions when he was constructing his theory (Hoffman: 2002; Sid-Ahmed: 1999).

Following Fukuyama’s paper, Samuel Huntington provided his own version of the new world order. His 1996 book ‘The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of a New World Order’ paints a dim view of the future. He predicts an increase in violence and an absence of values and clashes between civilizations. He urges Western governments to stick together and combine forces in order to weather this perceived threat (Hoffman: 2002; Huntington: 1996; Jisi & Sicheng: 1996; Seizaburo Sato: 1997).
The Huntington’s paper hints at a deep level of insecurity in the minds of Western civilization and could have dire consequences should it be followed too closely by policy makers (Jisi & Sicheng: 1996)

Not all analysts have such melodramatic theories, Henry Kissinger and Raymond Aron for example, take a far more relaxed view of the changes in international relations. Kissinger believes that a state’s power on the military and economic front determines its fate. To him the interdependence and international institutions created by globalization are secondary and fragile phenomena. And the main motivators of state’s objectives were threats to their survival or security. Aron supplements this theory by adding with what he calls “the germ of universal consciousness”. An idea that he bases on similarities in market norms from liberal developed states (Hoffman: 2002).

Discussion

Given the current political situation with new and contradictory ideologies emerging despite western democracy’s claim of supremacy, declaring ‘the end of ideology’ would be premature (Eriksen: 2001; Barber: 1992; Blinder: 2006; Hoffman: 2002; Jisi & Sicheng: 1996). Western claims of single superiority and ownership regarding the hegemonic ideology smacks of arrogance and ignorance (Barber: 1992; Hoffman: 2002; Jisi & Sicheng: 1996). Articles such as those by Rushdie (2001;2002) personify the egotistical qualities America is being accused of and that Huntington (1996) warn against. America and Anti-Americans (2002) in particular seems to be written with the sole intension of being as offensive as possible. Along with wild allegations and bold claims being made, he attributes self-degrading quotes (“We hate America because it has made of itself what we cannot make of ourselves.”) to ‘phantom’ Muslims on which he then builds an unconvincing argument, that jealousy is the motivation behind terrorism.

When one has been exposed to such bigotry, it may be tempting to judge ‘end of ideology’ theories too harshly, and it is important to note the context in which specific claims were made (Eriksen: 2001; Seizaburo Sato: 1997).There are significant flaws in arguments for the ‘end of ideologies’, but contemporary politics should be taken in to account (Eriksen: 2001). ‘The End of History’ was published in a time when the cold war was coming to an end. Communism had fallen and the victory of liberal western democracy over the other “lesser” ideologies seemed assured (Calhoun:2002; Heywood: 2002;Hoffman: 2002).

No claim of the indisputable triumph of one ideology over another can ever be truly justified (Barber: 1992; Hoffman: 2002; Jisi & Sicheng: 1996; Seizaburo Sato: 1997). In an ideal world it might indeed be possible that an ideology can be created that would satisfy all those involved, with no one group profiting from the exploitation of another but currently this is not possible (Barber: 1992; Blinder: 2006). What is true is that western ideals of liberal democracy have spread into large areas of the world, this spread does not guarantee conversion, it simply notes that other countries have been exposed to them (Barber: 1992; Blinder: 2006; Eriksen: 2001; Hoffman: 2002; Jisi & Sicheng: 1996; Seizaburo Sato: 1997).

A flaw of popular modern discourse surrounding the end of ideologies is that those who endorse them are most often Americans, who promote their own brand of liberal democracy, as is the case with Rushdie (1991; 2001; 2002). This version of liberal democracy and the approval of globalisation and ideas of a global culture are built on the premise that this new “global culture” will automatically mean “western culture”. Fukuyama advocates this idea of liberal democracy triumphing over all the others and in noting the spread of global capitalist markets, not only concludes the superiority of such a “capitalist ideology”, but sees such a victory as unavoidable. Despite seeming that way in the early 90’s when booming international markets and new innovations increased the power that America already had , it no longer rings true (Sid-Ahmed: 1999).
Conclusion

Human diversity and opposition to outside dominance are two key factors that support the “permanent” existence of multiple ideologies (Eriksen: 2001) Recent political developments have highlighted active resistance from those cultures forced into conversion and some have made it very clear that a “western ideology” is not synonymous to a “global ideology” (Barber: 1992; Hoffman: 2002; Huntington: 1996; Jisi & Sicheng: 1996).It is unlikely that the creation of a global ideology would automatically end all unrest , such complete assimilation would have greater chances for anarchy due to a lack of cohesion as predicted by Huntington. Thus far, globalization has failed to produce a collection of homogeneous individuals and has actually led to greater cultural variation and prominent expressions of uniqueness (Eriksen: 2001)

There are numerous difficulties imbedded in the concept of ‘the end of ideology’. The most obvious one is the assumption that the entire human population can or should be coerced into conforming to a single idea (Jisi & Sischeng: 1996)l. Such homogenisation completely ignores cultural diversity as well as failing to take in to account the various local contexts involved (Eriksen: 2001; Seizaburo Sato: 1997). A prominent factor in these calls by western hegemonies for homogenisation and forming a “global culture” is the assumption that other “weaker” countries need to modernise and evolve so they can become part of the global society (Rushdie: 2001; 2002). Westernisation is not the same as modernisation and intentions to coerce entire nations to convert to a flawed and exploitative ideology is patently absurd (Barber: 1992; Jisi & Sicheng: 1996; Seizaburo Sato: 1997). Capitalism has exploitation built in to its very nature and in order for one entity to profit, it inevitably means that another has to lose (Blinder: 2006). Ideologies with no intention to improve the lives of mankind go against the entire ideological concept and accepting an ideology so fundamentally flawed as the current capitalist model, would be to our own detriment.
Reference list

• Barber, B.R. 1992 ‘Jihad vs. McWorld’ in Atlantic Monthly, March 1992, pp. 53-65
• Blinder, A.S. 2006 ‘Offshoring: The Next Industrial Revolution?’ in Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006
• Bullock, A. 1969 Europe: Patterns of Power , Marshall Cavendish Book Lim.: London.
• Calhoun, C. (ed.) 2002 Dictionary of the Social Sciences, Oxford University Press: New York.
• Eriksen, T.H. 2001 ‘Politics and Power’ in Small Places, Large Issues: An Introduction to Social and Cultural Anthropology, Second Edition, Pluto Press: London, pp. 157-175
• Fukuyama, F. 1989 ‘The End of History?’ in The National Interest, Summer 1989
• Heywood, A. 2002 ‘Theories of Politics’ and ‘Nations and Globalization’ in Politics, Second edition, Palgrave Macmillan: China, pp.
• Hoffman, S. 2002 ‘Clash of Globalizations: A New Paradigm?’ in Foreign Affairs, July/August 2002
• Huntington, S. 1996 The Clash of Civilization and The Remaking of World Order, Touchstone Books: London
• Jisi, W. & Sicheng, Z 1996 ‘Civilizations: Clash or Fusion?’ in Beijing Review, Vol. 39, Issue 3, 3 Jan. 1996
• Rushdie, S. 1991 ‘One Thousand Days in a Balloon’ in New York Times, 12 Dec. 1991
• Rushdie, S. 2001 ‘Yes, This Is About Islam’ in New York Times, 2Nov. 2001
• Rushdie, S. 2002 ‘America & Anti-Americans’ in New York Times, 4Feb. 2002
• Sid-Ahmed, M. 1999 ‘Back to the End of History’ in Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue 428, 6-12 May, Published: Cairo
• Seizaburo Sato 1997 ‘The Clash of Civilizations: A View From Japan’ Special Colum on Huntington’s treatise “The Clash of Civilizations’ First of the Series, July 1997, Copyright: Institute for International Policy Studies & Okamoto International Affairs Research Institute